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Abstract
This paper examines the determinants of reelection of parties and mayors 
in Argentine local elections during the 1983-2011 period. Using a unique 
and comprehensive database recording local elecion results for over 1200 
local governments, we test three potential sources of variation: structural 
factors, polítical/institutional variables and economic variables. We find 
that incumbency advantage is strongly and significantly related with a 
higher probability of reelection. We also find some evidence supporting the 
economic voting hypothesis, that local economic conditions are relevant 
for explaining re-election of local governments. We also find that local gov-
ernments where parties and mayors have been in office for a long time have 
greater re-election chances. Finally, we find that governments with munici-
pal charters have lower probability of reelection. Summing up, there seems 
to be both economic and politico-institucional factors behind re-election 
rates of parties and mayors in Argentine local governments.
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Resumen
En el presente documento se examinan los factores determinantes de la 
reelección de partidos e intendentes en las elecciones locales de la Argen-
tina durante el período 1983-2011. Utilizando una base de datos única y 
completa que registra los resultados de las eleciones locales para más de 
1200 gobiernos locales, probamos tres fuentes potenciales de variación: 
factores estructurales, variables políticas/institucionales y variables eco-
nómicas. Encontramos que la ventaja de la titularidad está fuertemente y 
significativamente relacionada con una mayor probabilidad de reelección. 
También encontramos algunas pruebas que apoyan la hipótesis del voto 
económico, de que las condiciones económicas locales son relevantes para 
explicar la reelección de los gobiernos locales. También encontramos que 
los gobiernos locales donde los partidos y los alcaldes han estado en el 
cargo durante mucho tiempo tienen mayores posibilidades de reelección. 
Por último, encontramos que los gobiernos con cartas municipales tienen 
menores probabilidades de reelección. En resumen, parece haber factores 
tanto económicos como político-institucionales detrás de las tasas de ree-
lección de partidos y alcaldes en los gobiernos locales argentinos.
Palabras clave: Reelección; Transferencias; Política fiscal; Gobiernos locales
Códigos JEL: H72; C23; C25.
I. Background and motivation
Most federal regimes are either of two types: a two-tiered layout with 
local governments integrated into state governments or three-or-more-tiered 
layout with autonomous or semi-autonomous local governments. The latter 
is for example the case of Argentina, Brazil, South Africa and Switzerland. 
However, there are stark differences in autonomy of the local level between 
these countries. One dimension where this is particularly true is regarding 
assymetries between political and financial autonomy. In this case, local 
governments are faced with strong electoral incentives having little (if any) 
financial autonomy.
While there has been much study on the relationship between eco-
nomic and political variables and electoral outcomes in federal regimes, 
most of the work has focused on federal-state relations. Only a small frac-
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tion of both theoretical and applied work has studied economic and political 
aspects of inter-governmental relations looking at the local level [(Brollo 
and Nannicini 2012), (Timmons and Broid 2013), (Arvate 2013), (Sour 
2013), (Boulding and Brown 2014), (Freille and Capello 2014a), (Bracco et 
al. 2015), (Rodríguez-Chamussy 2015)].
The study of electoral dynamics at the local level is important for 
several reasons. Firstly, local governments may be both economically and 
electorally relevant. A large part of economic activity is ultimately based in 
and around cities regardless of whether these are part of larger administrative 
unit. Therefore, the existence of high local tax bases may encourage a high 
degree of political competition and also some degree of inter-level conflict 
for those resources. Naturally, if the distribution of economic resources is 
concentrated in only a handful of cities across a country, then this argument 
may be less important. But even if a municipality is economically marginal 
it can still be politically relevant due to overrepresentation in provincial leg-
islative bodies and to political alignment with the upper level government. 
The interaction between economic assymetries and political relevance may 
give rise to a wide range of inter-level coalitional dynamics.
Secondly, the existence of local elections allows us to draw better 
insights into voter preferences and the way they reward or punish politicians 
at different levels. This concern can be related to the long-standing litera-
ture on economic voting.1 The central idea is known as the responsibility 
(accountability) hypothesis: voters hold the government responsible for 
economic events. In this sense, local economic conditions may influence 
national electoral results. This is especially true when there are no local 
elections and therefere voters use the local environment as a proxy for the 
country’s general situation; they may also consider that national government 
policies have an impact on the local economy. When there are local elec-
tions, however, this idea may not always ring true. The problem is that the 
responsilibty hypothesis does not account for the fact that voters may have 
different beliefs and information when rewarding or punishing incumbents 
from different levels [(Martins and Veiga 2013)]. For instance, one could 
argue that local governments should not be held accountable for economic 
results which are beyond their control, like monetary or trade policy. It is 
clear that there may a problem of assigning responsability for local econom-
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1. For an excellent survey of this literature, see (Paldam 1981).
ic conditions between local and the provincial and national levels of govern-
ment. Unless voter preferences and political parties are homogeneous across 
jurisdictions, it would be reasonable to expect that the way in which voters 
allocate responsibility between different levels varies across jurisdictions.
Thirdly, in many countries, especially those with a federal regime, 
public goods provision has become more decentralized in recent decades. 
While the central level expenditures are dominated by transfers to govern-
ments and persons, sub-national governments are responsible for the provi-
sion of most public services. Local governments in particular are especially 
important in the provision of infrastructure. On the revenue side, there is 
great heterogeneity across countries. On most federations, states are exclu-
sively entitled to collect at least one broad-based tax such as a sales tax 
and rely on transfers from the national government. Local governments, on 
the other hand, rely mostly on property taxes and transfers from the state 
government. There are significant disparities in the degree of financial de-
pendence from upper-level jurisdictions. For example, the share of local 
governments own-source revenue averages 83% of total municipal revenues 
for Canada and over 40% for United States. In contrast, these shares are 
significantly lower in developing countries: local governments in Brazil, 
Mexico and Argentina collect locally on average around 35%, 30% and 25% 
of total revenues, respectively.
A high degree of financial dependence from the provincial and na-
tional government may create incentives to politically capture local govern-
ments by making them financially dependent from upper level governments 
[(Gibson and Calvo 2000)]. In these cases, it would be important to study 
whether inter-governmental transfers from upper to lower-level govern-
ments are related with local election outcomes. Unfortunately, we were una-
ble to collect homogeneus data on transfers to municipalities in Argentina.2
In this paper, we undertake what we believe is the first comprehensive 
empirical study of the determinants of re-election of parties and mayors in lo-
cal-level elections in Argentina. We explore several hypothesis ranging from 
economic voting to institutional explanations. Our contribution in this paper 
is two-fold. Firstly, we provide an explanation of the determinants of elec-
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2. Each province has a different tax-sharing arrangement within its territory with multiple classifi-
cations of transfers and grants. In addition to this, there is just no publicly available data for 2/3 
of the provinces.
toral outcomes in local elections for the entire democratic period from 1983 
to 2011. Secondly, we contribute to the growing literature on sub-national 
politics in Argentina by focusing on local rather than provincial elections. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we review the literature and 
outline some theoretical considerations that motivate our analysis. Section 3 
describes characteristis of the Argentine local government system. Section 4 
describes the data and the methodology of estimation. Section 5 concludes.
II. Literature
There is a vast and expansive literature on the relation between 
electoral outcomes and economic, political and institutional characteristics. 
There are various competing and complementary hypotheses as to what 
drives electoral performance of incumbents and challengers both in eco-
nomics and political science. Perhaps the most established and long-stand-
ing theory is that of political business cycles. This literature suggests a 
theoretical and empirical link between macroeconomic performance and 
electoral patterns. More specifically, incumbent governments can manip-
ulate the economy to seek re-election and they will do that by increasing 
spending (and deficits) before elections. (Alesina and Roubini 1992) provide 
an excellent review and comprehensive empirical tests of the early models 
of (Nordhaus 1975), and (Hibbs 1977) and the rational-choice models of 
(Rogoff and Sibert 1988), (Rogoff 1990), and (Alesina 1987). While they 
find no evidence of a systematic opportunistic cyle of the Nordhaus type 
–increase of pre-electoral output and employment-, they do find post-elec-
toral increases in inflation which may be consistent with pre-electoral 
budget cycles as suggested by the rational-choice models.3 These findings 
were replicated in several empirical papers which found the existence of 
political budget cycles –larger deficits in election years due to spending for 
both developed and developing countries [(Shi and Svensson 2002a), (Shi 
and Svensson 2002b), (Persson and Tabellini 2005), (Brender and Drazen 
2005), (Brender and Drazen 2008)]. These cycles have also been found to be 
very relevant in countries with unstable and new democracies such as Latin 
American countries. Using different periods and countries, several papers 
find sizeable increases in expenditure and lower budget surpluses in the year 
before the election [(Ames 1987), (Kraemer 1997), (Nieto Parra and Santiso 
2009), and (Barberia and Avelino 2011)].
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3. This may be particularly relevant for the case of fiscal favours to key constituencies.
The studies mentioned above examine political budget cycles at the 
country level. It is only in recent years, with the growing availability of 
data, that scholars have turned to study political business cycles and more 
generally the determinants of electoral performance at the sub-national 
level. (Levitt 1995) shows that higher federal transfers to a constituency 
increases the congressional incumbent’s vote share by a significant margin. 
(Veiga and Veiga 2007) is one of few studies that focus on political budget 
cycles at the municipal level using Portuguese data. Their results support the 
hypothesis of strong opportunistic behaviour by incumbents. (Akhmedov 
and Zhuravskaya 2004) use monthly regional-level data for Russia and find 
significant political budget cycles and also find these increase the probabili-
ty of getting reelected. Using a panel for 268 US cities over a 30 year period, 
(Bee and Moulton 2015) find a significant increase in public employment 
in the election year but no changes in spending or taxes. Using data from 
Chinese counties, (Guo 2009) documents the existence of a political budget 
cycle even in a non-election setting: mayors increase spending to advance 
their chances of advancing their political careers. Finally, a recent study by 
(Alesina and Paradisi 2017) finds significant political budget cycles for Ital-
ian cities by means of lowering tax rates as election nears. This result echoes 
(Besley and Case 1995b) which suggest that a state’s fiscal performance, as 
measured by tax policy relative to neighbouring jurisdictions, is central to 
voters’ decision to reelect or oust an incumbent.
Several papers have studied the effect of political institutions on 
policy choices and election outcomes. (Besley and Case 1995a) find that gu-
bernatorial term limits have significant effects on economic policy choices. 
Governors who faced term limits and therefore could not run for reelection 
(known as lame ducks in the political science jargon) were associated with 
higher taxes and government spending relative to incumbents who were 
able to run for another term. (Brender 2003) finds that fiscal perormance 
of mayors has a positive impact on incumbent’s reelection in Israel local 
elections. Other authors have explored features of the political system as 
determinants of reelection of parties and mayors. (Ferraz and Finan 2011) 
find a significant association with political institutions and reelection.
There has been growing interest to examine political budget and 
cycles and determinants of electoral outcomes at the sub-national level in 
Latin America. There has been a large number of studies exploring econom-
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ic and political determinants of state and local election outcomes in Brazil. 
(Sakurai and Menezes-Filho 2008) finds that mayors with higher spending 
(especially capital spending) increase their (and their party’s) reelection 
prospects. (Titiunik 2009) finds that incumbency has a strong negative effect 
on the probability of reelection for Brazilian municipalities. (Sakurai and 
Menezes-Filho 2011) find a significant political business cycle for Brazilian 
municipalities in the 1989-2005 period. Using state-level data, (Arvate et al. 
2009) find no evidence that a political budget cycle increased the reelection 
of governors and in fact they find quite the opposite: fiscally conservative 
states have a higher probability of re-election.
A large part of this research effort in Latin America may be loose-
ly tied to the strand that studies inter-governmental relations. According 
to (Cingolani, Mazzalay, and Nazareno 2009), recent work on the area of 
intergovernmental relations stress the allocation and distribution of finan-
cial resources between the different levels of government. The literature 
on fiscal federalism has gradually shifted from the study of efficiency and 
welfare effects associated with different decentralized settings to the study 
of the political rents derived by governments from different levels from the 
allocation and distribution of funds and grants [(Bordalejo 2005), (Paniagua 
2012)]. In other words, this literature highlights the role and examines the 
consequences of the existing institutional arrangements, the different trends 
at the subnational level and the wide range of motivations of political actors.
In this sense, the study of political aspects of federalism involves a 
fundamental question: whether the logic behind the the inter-governmental 
allocation of resources is programatic or particularistic. This depends on dif-
ferent factors –economic, political, etc- as has been pointed out by (Cingola-
ni, Mazzalay, and Nazareno 2009). Factors such as political power, electoral 
competition and the institutional design are relevant to explain the degree to 
which different parties and politicians can engage in either type of alloca-
tion. In light of this, it is important to note the role of the characteristics of 
the electoral and party system. This is all the more relevant in federal coun-
tries where electoral politics takes place amidst a mix of national, regional 
and local parties competing for offices at different levels of government.
There is also a small but growing literature studying determinants of 
electoral outcomes at the local level in Argentina. (Porto and Porto 1999) 
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suggest that fiscal performance during the election year and the previous 
year is a significant predictor of the probability of reelection of local mayors 
in the Buenos Aires province. Similarly, (Porto and Porto 2000) find that 
capital expenditures are associated with a greater probability of reelection. 
More recently, a paper by (Cingolani, Mazzalay, and Nazareno 2009) finds 
that municipalities and townships which receive discretionary transfers in 
the election year increase their probability of reelection. Another paper by 
(Paniagua 2012) find that provincial transfers are distributed politically to 
municipal governments in her study of two Argentine provinces, Buenos 
Aires and Córdoba. (Rumi 2014) shows evidence that suggest that the fed-
eral government manipulates total transfers to favour state governments 
which are politically aligned. Finally, (Freille and Capello 2014b) examine 
the determinants of electoral outcomes for local governments of the prov-
ince of Cordoba. They find that the probability of reelection is increasing in 
the amount of per capita discretionary transfers.
Suárez Cao (2011) examines whether Argentine political federalism 
has become more entrenched as political competition at the sub-national lev-
el has become ever more influential on national politics. The author suggests 
that the 1994 Constitutional reform strengthened the power assymetries be-
tween the President and the governors against the latter although governors 
still retain some bargaining power over two aspects: the legislative coalition 
and territorial support for the Presidential race.Other authors have suggested 
that it is not the state-level but rather the local-level government which has 
gained a prominent role in federal politics. This is what (Fenwick 2010) 
argues suggesting that given certain institutional configurations, the national 
government may better achieve its policy goals by collaborating directly 
with local governments. She shows that this appears to have been the case in 
the area of social protection in Brazil. The type of institutional arrangements 
leading to an effective national-local coalition, she argues, is less likely to 
appear in a country like Argentina where local governments are more likely 
to be captured by state-level governments. (González 2012) also provides a 
comparative study between Argentina and Brazil concluding that state-level 
governments have maintained (Argentina) or reduced (Brazil) their political 
power in the period 1983-2009.
Despite these recent contributions, determinants of re-election of lo-
cal parties and mayors have been studied only either for selected provinces 
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and/or for certain elections. In this paper we aim to provide a more general 
study of the determinants of electoral outcomes at the local level covering a 
large number of local governments and elections. Using a uniquely assem-
bled dataset, we study determinants of re-election of parties and mayors in 
Argentina.
III. Local governments in a federal country: The Argentine case
Argentina is a federal country divided into 23 provinces and one 
autonomous city, Buenos Aires. These provinces are divided into 2218 au-
tonomous municipalities, the only exception being the autonomous city of 
Buenos Aires which consists of 15 communes comprising over 48 neigh-
bourhoods. The financial relations between different levels of government 
are stipulated by the so-called Régimen de Coparticipación Impositiva. 
This regime basically sets up a tax-sharing scheme between the Federal and 
provincial levels of government: there are both nation- and province-level 
taxes. The latter are raised and collected by the provinces while the former 
are raised and collected by the Nation. A fraction of the amount collected 
in national taxes –called the Masa Co-participable– is “devolved” to the 
provinces (the so-called automatic transfers) while the rest goes to finance 
expenditures by the National government and the Social Security System. 
The Federal government also grants discretionary, non-automatic transfers 
to the provinces.
After the Federal level, provinces are the second most important 
level of government accounting for nearly 40% of total consolidated public 
spending. Provinces have political, judicial and administrative autonomy. 
The National Constitution of 1994 grants them autonomy to create and 
establish their own laws and to decide upon their electoral system, their 
administration of justice. They can create administrative or socio-economic 
regions, set up their own taxes and sign international agreements and trea-
ties. Provinces are also autonomous to manage their own natural resources 
and are in charge of providing several social services as primary and sec-
ondary education.
Altough total spending by local (municipal) governments has been 
increasing in the last 40 years, it represents a minor fraction –around 8%- of 
total consolidated public spending. The composition of total public consoli-
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dated spending from 1980 to 2017 can be seen in Figure 1. Spending by all 
local governments have slowly increased over the last 40 years going from 
around 5% of total consolidated public spending to around 8% in 2017. 
It can be noted, however, that there have been significant changes in the 
spending shares of provincial and national levels.
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Figure 1. Composition of total consolidated spending by level of government
Local governments are autonomous in that they elect their own ex-
ecutive and legislative officers. Mayors and councillors are chosen through 
free regular elections held either autonomously or concurrently with pro-
vincial or national elections. Municipalities have exclusive and shared com-
petences. The exclusive powers include waste collection and management, 
public transportation and street lighting. In practice, it is the provinces 
which grant legal status and autonomy their local governments. This means 
that the degree of local government autonomy varies across provinces. This 
is particularly true when it comes to financial autonomy. Each province reg-
ulates the fiscal arrangements with the local government level. In practice, 
this means that there are often tensions between the two levels over the 
financial arrangements.
Fuente: elaboración propia
Around a half of local governments have the legal status of munic-
ipality .In most provinces, a population of at least 10000 is required for a 
municipality to earn the right of sanctioning their own municipal charter 
equivalente to a Constitution for the national level. Smaller local govern-
ments are not given this right. In many aspects, Argentine municipalities are 
afforded a great deal of autonomy by law. Due to the tax-sharing system, 
however, in practice municipalities are heavily dependent on both automatic 
and discretionary transfers from above (both provincial and national level). 
This is the case for the large majority of Argentine local governments where 
own-source municipal revenues amount to less than half ot total revenues; 
in many cases, own-source revenues are less than 10% of total revenues. 
In other words, on average for municipalities in over half of the Argentine 
provinces, only around 3 out of 10 pesos –the local currency- are locally 
collected.5
Municipal governments in Argentina are heterogenous in several as-
pects. They differ in total population –three municipalities with over a mil-
lion inhabitants while several municipalities in Chaco, Corrientes and other 
provinces have less than 1000 inhabitants-, economic status –from rich and 
resourceful agricultural and industrial districts with large tax bases to deso-
late and impoverished municipalities with little own-source revenues-, and 
the extent of their capacity and autonomy –municipalities providing a wide 
range of public services to municipalities providing only the most basic set 
of services. Figure 2 shows the average local government population and the 
total number of local governments by province. The five largest provinces 
–Buenos Aires (BUE), Mendoza (MZA), Córdoba (CBA), Santa Fe (SFE), 
and Entre Ríos (ERI) have very different distributions of local governments. 
While the first two have the largest average population by local government, 
local governments in the latter are amongst the least populated districts on 
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4. Each province has its own municipal regime which, among other things, specify the population 
criteria for being considered a municipality and provisions regarding their autonomy. The po-
pulation requirements are usually higher in larger provinces –criteria range from 2000 to 10000 
for Santa Fe, Córdoba and Salta- than in smaller provinces –criteria range from 500 to 1000 for 
Catamarca, Corrientes, Chaco, La Pampa, Neuquén and Santa Cruz. Several provinces define 
different types of municipalities according with population size; this often entails different fiscal 
and political autonomy regimes. The legal status for units not meeting the population requirement 
for a municipality varies between provinces –Comisión de Fomento, Comuna, Comisión Muni-
cipal, Delegación Municipal, Comisión Rural– although most of them face similar restrictions on 
their fiscal and political autonomy.
5. This includes the sale of public assets and capital resources which are highly volatile.
average. For all the other provinces, however, a clear pattern emerges: there 
seems to be negative association between total number of local governments 
and average population size.
Fuente: elaboración propia
Revista de Economía y Estadística | Vol. LVI| N° 1| 2018 | pp. 59-87 | ISSN 0034-8066 | e-ISSN 2451-7321
Freille, Mazzalay70
Figure 2. Number of local governments and average population by district size 
(total population)
IV. Data and methodology
Our data includes 1804 local governments . If we rank municipal 
governments according to their population size, the top 1%, 5% and 10% 
comprised 35%, 68% and 80% of total population in 2011. Equivalently, the 
remaining 90% of the local governments –around 1750 local governments- 
comprise only around 20% of total population.
Our data comes from different sources. Data for the period 1983-1999 
was obtained from (Cao 1999). The remaining periods were assembled by 
consulting the Dirección Nacional Electoral and the electoral authority of 
each province. Economic data were obtained from various Census of Popu-
6. There are 1947 local governments in our original database but we exclude two provinces from 
consideration, Corrientes and Santiago del Ester. These provinces were intervened by the Federal 
government during the 90’s decade. Due to these interventions, local elections were often held at 
irregular periods and did not follow the electoral calendar of other provinces. In our estimations, 
we also exclude all those local governments which do not have complete and full information on 
electoral results for the full period
lation. The gender of mayors was automatically assigned by matching mayor 
names with names in the directory of Registro Nacional de las Personas. All 
other data were obtained from municipalities and provincial official websites.
Although we have a balanced panel structure –1804 local units ob-
served for 8 periods– we were unable to collect election data for all govern-
ments and periods. We have complete data –all 8 (eight) municipal elections 
for all local governments- only for a few provinces (Buenos Aires, Chaco, 
San Juan, Santa Fe, Mendoza). For most provinces we missing data particu-
larly for the first 3 or 4 elections. If we exclude the 1983, 1987 and 1991 
election, our data on election and re-election covers almost 94% (parties) 
and 87% (mayors) of total amount of elections in this period (a total of 
9026 local government elections). In summary, we have complete electoral 
history on incumbency, releection/change for over 1245 local governments 
and 851 local mayors. This will be our sample for the empirical analysis.
As we noted earlier, local governments are heterogeneous along sev-
eral dimensions. We have highlighted a few of these dimensions above but it 
is also important to see if there is heterogeneity along electoral lines. Table 1 
shows aggregate electoral results grouping by the population size of the lo-
cal government. We show the number of government units falling into each 
group, the number of elections (although our data covers 8 elections, 1983 
is the base year so there is no re-election data). Several things are impor-
tant to note. Firstly, there is significant heterogeneity in terms of population 
size. However, it can be seen that over 90% of governments in our sample 
are under 50000 inhabitants and 67% are under 10000 inhabitants. In oth-
er words, a large majority of local governmnets in Argentina are relatively 
small in terms of population. Secondly, re-election rates of both parties and 
mayors vary according to size. Re-election rates of parties tend to be around 
60% for very small and small municipalities, they decrease to 52-55% for 
middle-sized municipalities and they are around 50% for very large munic-
ipalities. For mayors, the numbers are between 5 and 15% smaller than for 
parties although, unlike for parties, there is a marked downward trend as 
municipalities increase in population.
We build on a very basic model of re-election by just including two 
types of variables: incumbency dummies for 6 major parties (type of parties) 
identified in our dataset –inc3JUS if incumbent party is Partido Justicial-
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ista, inc3UCR for Unión Cívica Radical, inc3PPPR for a provincial-based 
party, inc3PROG for a progresist-oriented party, inc3VEC for local-based 
party; the remaining variables are political alignment with the state level 
government (alignp3) and population size. Due to data limitations, we were 
unable to collect enough data on the local government’s degree of electoral 
competition and other political variables. We expand this baseline model to 
introduce a few aditional controls for structural (economic and social) fac-
tors that may have an effect on the probability of re-election. Our baseline 
model is therefore:
ri,t = α.INCi,t + β.alignp3i,t + γ.popi,t + ϵi,t
where ri,t  is a dummy taking value of 0 if a party/mayor of local 
government i is re-elected on election t; INC are a set of party incumbency 
dummies; and alignp3i,t  is a dummy scoring 1 if the incumbent local party 
is politically aligned with the incumbent provincial party.9
V. Parties
We first examine the determinants of re-election of parties. Since the 
outcome variable is binary –1 when a party/mayor is reelected; 0 otherwise-, 
we use a generalized linear model to run the data models. Table 2 present 
the results of the regressions of re-election of parties and mayors respec-
tively. Looking at column 1 we see that all variables have the expected sign. 
Incumbency is associated with higher probability of re-election, especially 
for the two major national parties –Partido Justicialista and Unión Cívica 
Radical- and for provincial-based parties. It is also important to note, that 
compared to other uncategorized parties (the reference category), also pro-
gresist-oriented party and local-based parties, they have associated a greater 
probability of re-election. Being aligned with the provincial party is associ-
ated with a greater probability of being reelected. Population size does not 
seem to be associated with the probability of being reelected.
The remaining three models split the full period in three sub-periods 
according to changes in political leadership and economic policies: the Al-
fonsin years (1983 through to 1991); the Menem years (1995, 1991 and 2003 
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9. In practice, we measure this if both incuments belong to the same party label. There is no easy way 
to build a more realistic political aligment variable.
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Table 2. Re-election of parties: Baseline and sub-period models
elections); and the Kirchner period (2007 and 2011 elections). Although this 
may be arbitrary, the political dynamics and economic structure of each of 
these periods were starkly different and it is probably a good idea to consid-
er them separately to see whether there are different regimes within eachs 
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All 1983-1991 1995-2003 2007-2011
inc3JUS 2741*** 2849*** 13.549 2121***
(0.538) -1.066 -225.547 (0.634)
inc3PPPR 2694*** 2459** 13.050 2897***
(0.547) -1.092 -225.547 (0.655)
inc3PROG 1903*** 2961*** 11.113 1645**
(0.551) -1.106 -225.548 (0.657)
inc3UCR 2190*** 2807*** 12.776 1928***
(0.536) -1.060 -225.547 (0.633)
inc3VEC 1997*** 2318** 12.860 1524**
(0.546) -1.109 -225.547 (0.648)
factor(year)1991 0.527
(0.604)
factor(year)1999 0.121
(0.094)
factor(year)2003 0.565**
(0.091)
factor(year)2011 0.092
(0.098)
alignp3 0.731*** 0.806*** 0.352*** 1531***
(0.062) (0.161) (0.083) (0.126)
Pop 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000** 0.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Constant 1935*** 2717** 12.249 1828***
(0.535) -1.215 -225.547 (0.632)
Observations 7,458 1,249 3,719 2,49
Log Likelihood 4,275.618 700.320 2,163.605 1,323.391
Akaike Inf. Crit. 8,567.235 1,418.639 4,347.210 2,664.781
Note:*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01
sub-period. Results are very similar for both the intial and final sub-period 
but the middle period has several interesting results. Firstly, incumbency 
dummies are no longer significant. Secondly, the political alignment coeffi-
cient is much smaller than in the two other sub-periods. The main reason for 
these changes, we believe, is due to the unprecedent number of party chang-
es around the 1999-2003 period, exacerbated by the huge socio-economic 
crisis of the year 2001-02.
Table 3 incorporates additional controls. Firstly, model 1 includes 
two variables that further captures political aspects: alignn2 which is a dum-
my measuring whether the local government is aligned with the national 
party; yrspr3 is a variable that records the number of years that the party has 
been in power. Somewhat surprisingly, alignn2 is found to be negatively 
correlated with the probability of re-election at the local level. On the other 
hand, the longer the party has been in power is associated with a higher 
probability of re-election, which is expected. In the next model, we run the 
incumbency dummies, the political controls and some economic variables. 
Unfortunately, the economic indicators are only available at the department 
level.10 This is the reason why column 2 sees a huge drop in the number 
of observations. Looking at the sign of the economic variables, regional 
economic conditions are positively associated with the probability of local 
re-election. It appears that short term indicators such as percent of popula-
tion employed, popocupdept are more important when it comes to explain-
ing re-election of incumbents. Long-term conditions, measured in this case 
using the percent of population with unmet basic needs, nbipobdept are not 
significantly associated with re-election of local governments.
The next two columns reproduce the same models analyzed above 
but we estimate them using generalized linear mixed-effects models. These 
models allow for estimation of random intercepts for groups and variables. 
In our case, since we have only a few economic and political variables, we 
aim at controlling at least partly for the unobserved heterogeneity in our 
sample. For this reason, we test for regional heterogeneity, including ran-
dom effects terms for both province and department. Basically, we estimate 
a mean and a standard deviation for each random intercept both at prov-
ince-level and department-level. Figure 3 shows a plot drawing means and 
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10. Departments are administrative units in which provinces are divided. They have no political or 
electoral relevance but they are often used since they are units of data aggregation.
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Table 3. Re-election of parties: Economic controls and linear mixed models
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
inc3JUS 2698*** 1802*** 1963*** 2133***
(0.539) (0.646) (0.326) (0.670)
inc3PPPR 2617*** 3105*** 1983*** 3862***
(0.548) (0.693) (0.349) (0.732)
inc3PROG 1883*** 1633** 1163*** 2062***
(0.551) (0.699) (0.343) (0.720)
inc3UCR 2166*** 0.961 1374*** 0.848
(0.538) (0.649) (0.325) (0.675)
inc3VEC 1949*** 1605** 1124*** 1616**
(0.546) (0.663) (0.337) (0.685)
alignp3 0.727*** 1365*** 0.578*** 1095***
(0.062) (0.115) (0.056) (0.125)
alignn2 0.170*** 0.219 0.155*** 0.066
(0.058) (0.134) (0.055) (0.146)
yrsp3 0.020*** 0.031*** 0.011*** 0.027***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007)
popocup_dept 0.021** 0.016*
(0.008) (0.009)
nbipob_dept 0.012 0.010
(0.009) (0.012)
pop 0.00000 0.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000)
Constant 2041*** 2672*** 1117*** 2388***
(0.535) (0.761) (0.331) (0.821)
Observations 7,458 2,49 8,715 2,49
Log Likelihood 4,259.021 1,341.295 4,978.327 1,305.802
Akaike Inf. Crit. 8,538.043 2,706.589 9,978.654 2,637.603
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 10,056.450 2,713.264
Note:*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01
standard deviation for each province. It can be seen that there is a significant 
degree of heterogeneity being captured by these random intercepts.
VI. Mayors
On average for the whole sample, mayor re-election rates are lower 
than those of parties. The mean re-election rate of parties stands at 56% 
while that of mayors stands at 48% (see Table 1. This may be due to several 
factors such as the existence of term limits, furthering political careers, and 
other institutional constraints such as party primaries. For example, our data 
shows that the re-election rate for mayors in governments with municipal 
charter is only 37% while it is almost 40% higher (reeelection rate of 49%) 
in governments without municipal charter. In this section we test a model of 
mayor re-election using a model much like that of the previous section but 
with a few variables controling for personal and local-level characteristics.
The first column in Table 4 includes all years. Columns 2 through 4 
run the models using specific time periods. Model 2 includes elections from 
1983, 1987 and 1991, model 3 includes the 1995, 1999 and 2003 election 
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Figure 3: Random intercepts for “provinces” (Parties)
and finally model 4 includes only 2007 and 2011. The choice of sub-periods 
is not entirely arbitrary as each period corresponds itself with a different 
political and economic structure (Alfonsin and aftermath during 1983 and 
1991; Menem and aftermath during 1995 and 2003; Kirchners 2007, 2011.). 
All variables have the expected sign but party incumbency dummies are no 
longer significant: while this may seem odd, it may be partly explained due 
to the fact that mayors are often quite independent from party structures.11 
Only the alignment dummy seems to be significantly associated with the 
re-election of mayors.
In Table 5 we run additional models controling for other socioeco-
nomic and institutional factors. We focus on several variables. Firstly, we 
include variables controling for the number of years the party and/or mayor 
has been in power. While the number of years a party has been in power 
is not significant, the number of years a mayor has been in office is indeed 
positive and significant. Secondly, the existence of municipal charter may 
affect the probability of re-election of mayors negatively since charters often 
include restrictions on candidate re-election and impose strict term limits.12 
We test for this using variable carta in column 2. The coefficient for this 
variable is negative and significant implying a negative association between 
re-election limits and the probability of re-election of mayors. Finally, 
we include economic controls measuring employment and poverty level. 
The results are similar for the re-election of parties: higher employment is 
associated with a higher probability of re-election. However, the poverty 
indicator is significantly and positively associated with the probability of 
re-eleciton. This results is a bit counterintuitive as we would expect citizens 
to punish incumbents with bad economic records. One likely explanation is 
that poverty is a more structural feature than employment and that citizens 
do not held their local mayors accountable for it. Finally, we include one 
individual-level control, the gender of incumbent mayors. It can be seen that 
being a male mayor is associated with a greater probability of re-election.
Table 6 provide additional regressions that are used as robustness 
checks on the variables tested throughout the previous models. Models 1 
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11. Departments are administrative units in which provinces are divided. They have no political or 
electoral relevance but they are often used since they are units of data aggregation.
12. We only record whether a municipality has sanctioned a municipal charter or not. Due to the large 
number of municipalities that have charters, it would be impossible to record a variable measuring 
term limits.
Freille, Mazzalay78
Revista de Economía y Estadística | Vol. LVI| N° 1| 2018 | pp. 59-87 | ISSN 0034-8066 | e-ISSN 2451-7321
Determinants of party and mayor reelection... 79
All 1983-1991 1995-2003 2007-2011
inc3JUS 0.594 0.084 13.476 0.717
(0.381) (0.594) -308.038 (0.512)
inc3PPPR 0.101 0.045 13.161 0.420
(0.404) (0.599) -308.038 (0.577)
inc3PROG 0.766* 0.870 14.064 0.554
(0.400) (0.620) -308.038 (0.534)
inc3UCR 0.527 0.095 13.397 0.967*
(0.379) (0.572) -308.038 (0.513)
inc3VEC 0.812** 0.387 13.899 0.847
(0.395) (0.618) -308.038 (0.534)
factor(year)1991 0.043
(0.617)
factor(year)1995 0.129
(0.624)
factor(year)1999 0.756 0.127
(0.710) (0.098)
factor(year)2003 0.198 0.194**
(0.625) (0.098)
factor(year)2007 0.069
(0.627)
factor(year)2011 0.691 0.204**
(0.617) (0.102)
alignp3 0.088 0.225 0.143 0.248**
(0.068) (0.186) (0.096) (0.126)
Pop 0.00000* 0.00000** 0.00000 0.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Constant 0.580 0.308 13.487 0.855*
(0.376) (0.833) -308.038 (0.507)
Observations 5,106 1,666 2,547 1,699
Log Likelihood 3,525.596 1,126.182 1,749.377 1,167.263
Akaike Inf. Crit. 7,067.192 2,280.364 3,518.754 2,352.526
Note:*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01
Table 4. Re-election of mayors: Baseline and sub-period models
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
inc3JUS 0.654* 0.642* 0.672 0.641
(0.383) (0.382) (0.559) (0.561)
inc3PPPR 0.147 0.200 0.849 0.814
(0.405) (0.405) (0.631) (0.633)
inc3PROG 0.769* 0.754* 0.613 0.580
(0.400) (0.401) (0.609) (0.611)
inc3UCR 0.585 0.588 0.500 0.484
(0.381) (0.380) (0.566) (0.567)
inc3VEC 0.818** 0.813** 0.982* 0.939
(0.395) (0.396) (0.588) (0.590)
alignp3 0.086 0.093 0.375*** 0.379***
(0.068) (0.068) (0.129) (0.129)
alignn2 0.093 0.101 0.005 0.003
(0.062) (0.062) (0.146) (0.146)
yrsp3 0.002
(0.005)
yrsm 0.015** 0.012* 0.017* 0.016*
(0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010)
carta 0.501*** 0.543** 0.543**
(0.141) (0.217) (0.218)
popocup_dept 0.032*** 0.033***
(0.009) (0.009)
nbipob_dept 0.021** 0.022**
(0.010) (0.010)
gendM 0.553***
(0.190)
pop 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Constant 0.686* 0.665* 2324*** 2842***
(0.379) (0.380) (0.699) (0.724)
Observations 5,106 5,106 1,7 1,7
Log Likelihood 3,522.074 3,515.716 1,154.320 1,149.975
Akaike Inf. Crit. 7,066.148 7,053.432 2,334.639 2,327.950
Note:*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01
Table 5. Re-election of mayors: Additional institutional and economic controls
and 2 include some interaction terms to check for the possibility that the 
effect of poverty on re-election is condition on the political alignment var-
iables. We find that the poverty (nbipobdept) loses significance, both the 
non-interacted and the interacted term. Finally, including a control for the 
level of education (the percent of people who are eligible to attend school 
actually attending) does not bring a significant coefficient. Models 3 and 4 
are run using generalized linear mixed effects for those variables that we 
find significant in previous tables. It can be seen that most of the significant 
variables we found when running pooled logit regression are also significant 
here. Incumbency dummies, however loose significance. This may be due 
to the fact that some of these effects are being captured by the mixed effects 
both at the department and province level. A visualization of the random in-
tercepts for each province can be seen in Figure 4. These tables confirm the 
significant and positive association between the probability of re-election 
and incumbency, and the existence of municipal charter.
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Figure 4: Random intercepts for “provinces” (Mayors)
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Table 6: Re-election of mayors: Economic controls and linear mixed models
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
inc3JUS 0.846 0.707 0.308 0.786
(0.544) (0.558) (0.296) (0.580)
inc3PPPR 0.615 0.330 0.230 1.101
(0.607) (0.617) (0.347) (0.681)
inc3PROG 0.942 0.839 0.298 0.729
(0.595) (0.607) (0.316) (0.634)
inc3UCR 0.506 0.350 0.073 0.520
(0.541) (0.556) (0.294) (0.577)
inc3VEC 1105* 0.900 0.388 1089*
(0.572) (0.587) (0.314) (0.606)
alignp3 0.390** 0.184 0.046 0.335**
(0.191) (0.119) (0.063) (0.141)
nbipob_dept 0.001 0.014
(0.010) (0.014)
gendM 0.545***
(0.194)
yrsm 0.022** 0.021** 0.014** 0.010
(0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010)
carta 0.376* 0.426** 0.448** 0.635***
(0.212) (0.214) (0.153) (0.238)
alignp3:nbipob_dept 0.015
(0.013)
edasiste_dept 0.018
(0.017)
popocup_dept 0.030***
(0.009)
Constant 1028* 1389* 0.554* 2811***
(0.543) (0.753) (0.316) (0.793)
Observations 1,883 1,716 5,944 1,7
Log Likelihood 1,281.821 1,171.262 4,049.284 1,137.344
Akaike Inf. Crit. 2,585.642 2,362.523 8,120.569 2,302.688
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 8,194.160 2,378.826
Note:*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01
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VII. Concluding remarks
In this paper we have studied the determinants of electoral out-
comes in local elections –municipalities and townships- for a large sample 
of Argentine local governments during the 1983-2011 period. Our results 
suggests that re-election rates for local parties and mayors are related with 
both structural, institutional and economic characteristics. The main three 
factors that we have found to be statistically relevant to explainign differ-
ences in re-election rates of local parties and mayors are the incumbency 
dummies, the existence of a municipal charter, and the percent of employed 
population. There seems to be important regional/provincial election effects 
although we do not find large heterogeneity at the department level.
We believe these findings are to be taken cautiously. There are main 
reasons to do so. Firstly, there are many economic, political and institutional 
variables we do not observe that may be relevant to explaining re-election 
rates of parties and mayors. Secondly, for several variables, we do not have 
data at the local level and only census-level data at the department level. 
Due to these data being available at a less frequent periods, the greater detail 
on economis aspects comes at the expense of reducing sample sizes.
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IX. Appendix and data sources
The data for this paper has been collected over several years from 
many different sources. Data on elections and incumbencies were originally 
collected from Cao (1999)’s book “Elecciones y reelecciones en el nivel 
municipal argentino: 1983-1999”. We recoded and updated these data using 
information from the electoral bodies of all 24 Argentine electoral districts. 
We also obtained information from various secondary sources such as on-
line local newspapers and radios, websites specializing in local affairs and 
think-tanks aggregating electoral information.
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